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Abstract
Because many seniors choose Medicare Part D plans offering poorer coverage at greater
cost, we examined the effect of price frames, brand names, and choice set size on participants’
ability to choose the lowest cost plan. A 2x2x2 within-subjects design was used with 126
participants ages 18-91. Mouselab, a web-based program, allowed participants to choose drug
plans across eight trials that varied using numeric or symbolic prices, real or fictitious drug plan
names, and three or nine drug plan options. Results from our multi-level models suggest
numeric versus symbolic prices decreased the likelihood of choosing the lowest cost plan (-8.0
percentage points, 95% CI -14.7, -0.9). The likelihood of choosing the lowest cost plan
decreased as the amount of information increased suggesting decision cues operated
independently and collectively when selecting a drug plan. Redesigning the current Medicare
Part D plan decision environment could improve seniors’ drug plan choices.
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Millions of senior citizens report difficulties in choosing their Medicare Part D
prescription drug insurance plan (Konrad, 2009). With dozens of different insurance plans selling
prescription drugs for Part D and a lack of standardized benefits, it is no wonder that older adults
report difficulties. Despite its financial and health ramifications, little is known regarding how
older adults navigate the current maze of choices under the Part D program. We do know,
however, that saving money is the most important factor in their decision-making (MedPAC,
2007). Yet, the evidence shows that only a small minority are actually choosing the lowest-cost
plan available to them with potential individual losses of hundreds of dollars annually (Gruber,
2009).
As reported by Hanoch et al. (2009 & 2011) and others, the difficulty in choosing the
lowest cost plan for seniors is in part due to the sheer size of the choice set they face. Beyond
cost, medical decision-making research has demonstrated that how numeric information is
presented to consumers (e.g. quantitative or symbolic) can affect decision outcomes (Hibbard et
al., 2007; Dudley, Hibbard & Schaler, 2010). Factors such as company reputation play an
important role in consumers’ medical decisions as well (MedPAC, 2007). However, little is
known about how numeric information, like price, affects older adults’ Medicare Part D
decisions and how, if at all, older adults trade off between company reputation and costs. The
aim of this article is to investigate the effect of price frames (e.g., the use of symbols such as
$$$$ vs. numeric dollar amounts), real vs. fictitious company name (i.e., brand effects), and
choice set size on whether consumer choose the lowest cost Medicare Part D plan and, if they do
not, the dollar amount of the “loss.”
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To investigate these questions, we used a computer based process-tracing program called
“Mouselab” (Bettman, Johnson, and Payne 1990; Payne, Bettman, and Johnson, 1993).
Mouselab is a web-based decision environment which presents information about choices in a
grid but, akin the game “Memory”, the information in each cell is hidden. When the cursor
moves over the cell, the information is revealed allowing researchers to trace the decisionmaking process and record participants’ decisions.
In recent years a number of researchers have come to question the idea that increased
choice benefits consumers. Iyengar and colleagues, for example, have shown that offering more
choices—whether chocolate, jams, or job offers—can negatively affect performance and reduce
satisfaction (Iyengar and Lepper, 2000; Iyengar, Huberman, and Jiang, 2004; Iyengar, Wells, and
Schwartz, 2006). In one illustrative study, Iyengar, Huberman, and Jiang (2004) examined
80,000 individuals’ willingness to join a 401(k) retirement plan in relationship to the number of
plans to choose from. The authors found that the more choices employees had, the less likely
they were to join the program, a phenomenon referred to as “decision fatigue.” Decision fatigue
has also been shown to affect health insurance and retirement saving plans decisions
domestically (Besedeš et al. in press) and in other countries (Schram and Sonnemans, 2011).
The Medicare Part D program offers a policy relevant, real world setting to examine the
effect of choice set size on older adults’ performance. Capitalizing on this idea, Bundorf and
Szrek (2010) have found that on the one hand having a larger number of drug plans to choose
from (2, 5, 10, and 16) increased participants’ satisfaction with their decision; on the other hand,
it also amplified their desire to see fewer options on the menu. Other studies found that offering a
greater array of plan choices size negatively affected both older and younger participants’
performance (Hanoch et al., 2009 & 2011).
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In our earlier investigations (Hanoch et al., 2009 & 2011), however, we did not examine
the questions of how brand name and price frame might affect older adults’ decision
performance. These are important factors to address, as a large body of research has shown that
consumers are sensitive to both brand name and the framing of numeric information (e.g.,
Grewal, et al., 1998; Smith and Brynjolfsson, 2001, Hibbard et al. 2007; Dudley, Hibbard, and
Shaller, 2010). More significantly, it has been shown that consumers often use brands names as a
proxy for product quality and thus create decision shortcuts (or heuristics) in making decisions.
A study comparing risk perception of generic vs. brand name drugs found that between 14-53%
of respondents perceived the generic drug as posing greater risk, and that a large financial
discount was required to convince consumers to purchase generic prescription drugs (Ganther
and Kreling, 2000). Looking at judgments and choices about an unknown product, Brucks,
Zeithaml, and Naylor (2000) showed that while brand names play a pivotal role in decision
making, consumers use price and brand name as independent factors in their decision process. A
Meta-analysis by Roa and Monro (1989) found that both brand name and price positively
predicted consumers’ perceived product quality.
Moreover, research by Hoyer and Brown (1990) and Maheswaran, Mackie and Chaiken
(1992) provide important insights regarding the relationship between brand name and decision
strategy. Brand name, it was found, was associated with sampling or evaluating fewer choices—
that is, reliance on more simplified decision strategy (Hoyer and Brown 1990; Maheswaran,
Mackie and Chaiken, 1992). Making a decision based on brand name, in addition, carried a
price: those who used brand name as a cue made inferior decisions.
A large corpus of data shows that brand names play a role in the decision processes and
outcomes. Whether price frame (symbol vs. numeric) has a similar effect is an open question. To
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our knowledge, only two studies have used symbols instead of numbers to examine consumer’s
decision performance in the health domain (Hibbard et a., 2007; Peters et al., 2007).
Unfortunately, these two studies did not examine how price frame affects participants’
performance. The researchers did find that presenting symbols instead of numbers with regard to
hospital quality did influence the participant’s choice (Hibbard, et al 2007; Peters et al. 2007).

New Contribution
To bridge the gap between prior work on price frames and brand effects in other medical
decision settings and Medicare Part D decisions, we investigated the role of these decision cues
as well as choice set size on whether participants chose the lowest cost plan and, conditional on
not choosing this plan, the amount of money they would have lost. We used four hypotheses to
guide our analysis. First, we hypothesized that numeric (vs. symbol) price frames make it more
difficult to choose the lowest cost plan and larger dollar losses conditional on choosing an
alternate plan (H1). Second, we predicted that having real (vs. fictitious) brand names are
associated with a lower likelihood of choosing the lowest cost plan and greater monetary loss
(H2). Third, we hypothesized increases in the size of the choice set also lowers the probability of
choosing the cheapest plan and increases dollar losses (H3). Finally, we predicted increasing the
amount of information in the decision environment, through combinations of the three conditions
above, is associated with lower likelihood of choosing the cheapest plan and higher financial
losses if an alternate plan was chosen (H4).

Methods

Sample
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The study was conducted in Claremont, California, a community 30 miles east of Los
Angeles. One hundred and twenty-nine individuals participated in the study. Of these, 126 had
complete data and were used in the main analysis. Aiming to recruit a sample across lifespan,
older participants were recruited from an existing senior participant pool and through
advertisements at senior centers. Younger participants were recruited from the staff and student
body of the Claremont Colleges and from community boards.

Study Design
MouselabWeb, an updated version of the original Mouselab, was used to examine
differences in participants’ decision outcomes across experimental conditions (Payne, Bettman,
and Johnson, 1988; Willemsen and Johnson, 2009). Mouselab has been used extensively to
understand how individuals acquire information and make choices in a range of decision-making
settings (Bettman, Johnson, and Payne, 1990; Johnson, Payne, and Bettman 1988). In this study,
the MouselabWeb design was adopted to simulate the official Medicare website.
A hypothetical scenario about a friend, “Bill,” was presented and all participants were
asked to help Bill choose a Medicare prescription drug plan. More specifically, participants read
the following paragraphs, and were asked to choose a Medicare drug plan based only on the
information presented to them:
Imagine that one of your friends, whom we’ll call Bill, has asked you to help
him in choosing a Medicare prescription drug plan. He has made it clear that he is not
sure how to choose among the different drug plans, and therefore would like you to
make the choice for him. However, Bill has told you a little about the type of drug
plan he would like. He does not want to spend a lot of money. That is, he wants to
keep his annual cost, monthly premium, and annual deductible as low as possible. He
is, however, not sure whether he should get a plan that offers coverage in the gap. He
is also interested in a company that he knows and feels he can trust. Finally, he
expects to get all of his drugs by calling a toll-free phone number, and having them
mailed to his home. In the screens that follow, you will see information about a range
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of drug plans (their name, their estimated annual cost, their monthly drug premium,
the number of network pharmacies, whether they offer coverage in the gap, and their
annual deductible). Please try to make the best choice for Bill.
After reading a scenario description on the Medicare prescription drug plan, participants
were instructed to choose the prescription drug plan that suits Bill’s needs. Information about
drug plans was presented on a computer screen and varied along six dimensions: plan name,
estimated annual cost, monthly drug premium, annual deductible, coverage in the gap, and
number of network pharmacies. The information presented for each plan was based on actual
Part D plans obtained from the Medicare website. Information on various plans and their
attributes was presented in a grid. Participants needed to move the computer mouse to see the
information hidden underneath labeled boxes (see Figure 1). Once they moved the cursor from
one box to the next, the previous box closed and the new one opened. They were also told that
definitions of insurance terms were available. Note taking was allowed to minimize working
memory load and was controlled for in the regression analyses. After clicking the “next page”
button, participants faced one of eight possible decision trials.
The eight trials represented all combinations of the three treatment conditions (price
frame, brand effects, choice set size). To avoid learning effects, the trails were randomly
presented through computerized design; thus the order was counter-balanced between subjects.
Because not all participants completed all of the trials, the 126 participants with complete data
represented 955 decision trials. After each trail, participants were asked to rate the most and least
important information across the six dimensions that affected their choice. The study protocol
was approved by the appropriate Institutional Review Boards and prior to the start of the study,
written informed consent was obtained. Participants also completed a demographic questionnaire
and were paid $20 per hour for their participation.
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Measures
Decision outcomes: We included two decision outcomes- whether the participant chose
the lowest cost plan and the dollar amount of loss if the participant did not choose the lowest cost
plan.
Primary regressors: We examined the amount of information in participants’ decision
environment using indicators for whether the trial had numeric or symbolic price frame
information, real or fictitious drug plan names, and three or nine drug plans to chose from. Four
categories of symbolic prices ranging from one dollar sign ($) to four dollar signs ($$$$) were
created based on the numeric prices of the plan in the complementary experimental condition.
Control variables: We controlled for demographics, note taking, and numeric literacy.
Demographic controls included an indicator for whether or not the respondent was over age 65,
gender (female or not), race/ethnicity (a dummy variable where Caucasian is the referent group),
education (at least some college or not), marital status (married or not), and mental and physical
component scores (MCS and PCS from the SF-12v2). Whether participants chose to take notes
during the task was also controlled for. Numeric literacy was controlled for using an 11- item
numeracy scale, which consists mostly of questions on the calculation of basic probabilities
(Lipkus, Samsa, and Rimer 2001).
Stated preferences about decisions: After each decision trial, participants were asked
which of the plan attributes (drug plan name, total annual cost, monthly premium, number of
pharmacies, coverage in the gap, annual deductible) was most and least important to them while
making their decision.
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Data Analysis
To examine associations of our experimental conditions with the decision outcomes
while controlling for observed confounders (i.e., demographics, note taking, numeric literacy)
and accounting for the within-subject repeated-measures design, we used multi-level regression.
Level-1 modeled information from each trial for each participant as separate observations.
Level-2 included a random intercept term for each individual to capture differences among trials
across participants. Interaction effects between the three experimental conditions were included
in the models.
To estimate the adjusted association price frames, brand effects, and choice set size with
the choosing the lowest cost plan, multi-level logistic models were used. Multi-level linear
regression models were used to estimate the adjusted associations of the experimental conditions
and the dollar value of loss if participants did not choose the lowest cost plan. Risk differences
were calculated representing the percentage point difference in the probability of choosing the
lowest cost plan between experimental conditions while holding the model covariates at their
original values. A similar approach was used to calculate the predictive margin of monetary loss.
Model predictions used to construct risk differences and predictive margins consider only the
fixed effect, or within person, portion of the multi-level logistic models and not the individual
random effect. Bias-corrected standard errors for risk differences and monetary loss margins
were obtained by bootstrapping using 1,000 replicates. An alpha-level of 5% was used to
determine the statistical significance of model estimates.

Results
Sample Characteristics
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Across the 955 trials, participants chose the lowest cost plan 46.0% of the time (Table 1).
On average, the loss associated with choosing a more expensive plan was $168.43 (SD = $84.07)
per year.
The participants were mostly female (63.2%). Less than half were over age 65 (42.0%),
of non-Caucasian race/ethnicity (39.6%), completed college (36.9%), were married (31.4%), or
took notes during the tasks (39.4%). The average mental component score (MCS) was 48.86
(SD 10.17) and participants had an average physical component score (PCS) of 49.33 (SD =
10.49). On average, participants scored 8.32 (SD = 2.27) on the numeracy scale. (The ranges
for these variables appear in Table 1).
Regarding participants’ preferences about what drug plan attributes were viewed as the
most and least important when making their decision, 44.1% of the overall sample indicated
estimated annual cost was most important, followed by coverage in the gap (18.5%) and monthly
premiums (16.7%); 4.9% of participants reported drug plan names were most important (table
available upon request). In line with the prompt that Bill would receive his prescriptions through
the mail, only 6% thought the number of pharmacies was most the important plan attribute. For
participants who did not choose the lowest cost plan, 28.3% reported coverage in the gap was
most important in making their decision suggesting a possible tradeoff between overall costs and
drug coverage. Conversely, 41.6% of the overall sample reported drug plan names were least
important when making their decision followed by the number of pharmacies (27.0%) and
coverage in the gap (21.1%).

Adjusted Associations of Decision Quality and Amount of Information
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After adjusting for observed confounders (Table 2), we found support for our first
hypothesis (H1) that participants facing a numeric versus symbolic price frame found it harder to
choose the lowest cost drug plan and, conditional on not choosing it, experienced larger
monetary losses. Participants in trials that used numeric (vs. symbolic) costs had an 8.0 (95% CI
-14.7, -0.9) percentage point lower probability of choosing the lowest cost plan while holding
model covariates at their original values. Participants in the experimental condition using
numeric prices who did not choose the lowest cost plan lost $55.29 (95% CI 43.16, 67.06) more
dollars after adjustment than those in the symbolic price condition.
The evidence did not support the hypothesis (H2) that real versus fictitious drug plan
names would lower the adjusted probability of choosing the lowest cost plan and higher losses.
Participants in trials using real rather than fictitious drug plans were equally likely to choose the
lowest cost plan (risk difference= -6.4 percentage points; 95% CI -12.7, 2.4) but experienced
smaller losses if they did not choose the lowest cost plan (-$17.80; 95% CI -29.79, -5.99).
Evidence from our adjusted models supported our third hypothesis (H3) that choosing
from among nine versus three drug plans would lower the likelihood of choosing the cheapest
plan and larger monetary losses if a more expensive plan was chosen. Nine versus three plans
was associated with a 30.9 (95% CI -35.6, -20.9) percentage point lower probability of choosing
the lowest cost plan while holding covariates at their original values. Participants choosing from
nine rather than three plans lost $40.31 (95% CI 24.79, 52.39) more dollars if they did not
choose the cheapest plan.
We next examined combinations of experimental conditions to test the hypothesis that
increasing the amount of information in the decision environment was associated with a lower
likelihood of choosing the lowest cost plan and larger losses conditional on choosing an
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alternative plan (H4). The results supported our fourth hypothesis in that, relative to a trial with
symbolic prices, fictitious brand names, and three drug plans, increasing the amount of
information by switching combinations of the experimental conditions resulted in lower
probabilities of choosing the cheapest plan and larger losses if an alternate plan was chosen. For
example, participants in a decision environment with numeric prices, real drug plan names, and
nine plans had a 56.0 (95% CI -63.4, -34.5) percentage point lower probability of choosing the
lowest cost plan compared to those facing symbolic prices, fictitious drug plan names and three
plans. They also lost $96.70 (95% CI 66.89, 119.15) if the lowest cost plan was not selected.
One exception to this finding was, as noted above, switching from fictitious to real brand names
while holding prices as symbolic and the number of choices at three plans was associated with
lower losses (-$30.46; 95% CI- 56.82, -8.37).
Although minimizing costs was considered the primary objective of the decision tasks in
our analysis, the prompt suggested participants may care about choosing a plan with coverage in
the gap and were interested in a drug plan they knew and could trust. Thus, a priori, participants
may have been willing to spend more money in order to choose a plan with coverage in the gap
or with a particular brand name. The preferences for plan attributes presented earlier suggest
individuals found drug plan names the least important regardless of whether they chose the
lowest cost plan suggesting individuals were not choosing more expensive, branded drug plans.
However, those who did not choose the lowest cost plan may have done so because they felt
coverage in the gap was important. To determine if some participants were making tradeoffs
between cost and coverage, we subdivided the sample to the 43 participants, representing 146
trials, who indicated coverage in the gap was most important and who did not choose the lowest
cost plan. We then created an indicator for whether or not these individuals chose the lowest
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cost plan among the subset of plans that included coverage in the gap and then repeated the
multi-level model analyses above. Due to sample size limitations, the interaction terms were not
included in the sub-analyses.
Among this subgroup, 76.0% chose the cheapest plan with coverage in the gap from the
remaining set of drug plans (Table 3). Similar to the overall sample, numeric prices and nine
plans were associated with lower probabilities of choosing the lowest cost plan with coverage in
the gap after adjusting for confounders. Switching from symbolic to numeric prices while
holding covariates at their original values was associated with a 14.5 (95% CI -27.6, -1.4)
percentage point decrease in the probability of choosing the lowest cost plan with coverage in the
gap. Similarly, increasing the choice set size from three to nine plans was associated with an
18.8 (95% CI -31.7, -5.9) point decline. Both of these experimental conditions were also
associated with increased monetary losses if an alternative plan was chosen (numeric
prices=$41.33, 95% CI 23.34, 59.31; nine plans=$62.18, 43.95, 80.41). These results when,
combined with the main analysis, suggest that whether participants primarily cared about cost or
whether they cared about coverage and cost, price frames and choice set size affected their
ability to choose plans in line with these preferences.
In general, age, marital status, level of education, race/ethnicity, and health controls were
not significantly associated with the odds of choosing the lowest cost plan or, conditional on
selecting a higher cost plan, the amount of money lost (covariate estimates available upon
request). Numeracy was also not significantly associated with the decision outcomes in our
regression models.

Discussion
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Do price frame, company name and choice set size affect Medicare Part D decision
performance? Our results suggest that price frames and choice set size matter. Participants in
choice environments using numeric rather than symbolic price frames had an eight-percentage
point lower probability of choosing the lowest cost plan. This finding is congruent with a recent
policy paper by Dudley, Hibbard and Shaler (2010) suggesting that using symbols rather than
numbers in health care decision tasks make data more evaluable and less cognitively
burdensome. Using qualitative rather than quantitative price information is, de facto, reductionist
but our results suggest reducing the price dimension from cardinal to ordinal improved
participants’ ability to select the lowest cost plan. Switching the presentation of cost and quality
data in the Medicare Part D choice environment from numeric to symbolic could help seniors in
their choice of a drug plan even if the remaining choice attributes (e.g. number of drug plans)
were kept at the status quo.
Our results add further evidence that reducing choice set size improves seniors’
performance in the Medicare Part D environment (Hanoch et al., 2009 & 2011). In fact, the
improvements in individuals’ choice performance are substantial. In addition to making an
initial drug plan selection more difficult, recent evidence also suggests increased choice size can
lead to “stickiness” (Frank and Lamirand, 2008; McWilliams et al., 2011). We know less than
10% of Medicare beneficiaries actually change plans during open enrolment (Neuman et al.
2007). One possibility this stickiness is that the sheer number of choices in the program reduces
the likelihood of changing drug plan, even when it is financially beneficial to do so. This
possibility is supported by an analysis of both the Swiss health insurance market and Medicare
Advantage, where consumers who faced more choice were less likely to switch plans (Frank and
Lamirand, 2008; McWilliams et al., 2011). To keep prices low and quality high in a market with
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fewer drug plan options, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services could act as an agent
for seniors. The Medicare Part D website could allow seniors to input the plan attributes they
care most about and then present them with a small subset of “preferred” options to choose from
with the remainder of the choice set available if the initial set does not meet the senior’s needs.
Our study has a number of limitations. First, the stakes of the choice tasks participants
completed were low. If we were examining real instead of hypothetical choices, individuals
might expend more mental resources to perform better. Second, given the community-based
convenience sampling frame employed, state and national inferences may be limited. Further,
compared to the general U.S. population of older (and younger) adults our sample was more
educated and had higher income. Nonetheless, our adjusted estimates should be broadly
generalizable insofar as controls for education also proxy for income. Third, better performance
with a smaller choice set may be explained by the fact that, given that participants guess, they are
more likely to guess correctly. An analysis of this competing hypothesis suggests this is not the
case. We found participants would have to be 5 times as likely to guess in the 9 plan condition
as in the 3 plan condition to account for the observed difference in the probability of choosing
the lowest cost plan.
In our study, brand names followed closely by number of pharmacies were the least
important factors in individuals’ choice of drug plans suggesting individuals were not choosing
more expensive plans due to brand effects or in order to purchase from more pharmacies.
However, respondents in 146 of the 516 trials in which participants did not choose the lowest
cost plan indicated that coverage in the gap was the most important factor in their decisions. This
subset represents an interesting case, as they might have been willing to pay a higher price for
more extensive drug coverage. Trading cost for coverage could indicate two (not mutually
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exclusive) possibilities. First, this subset might have greater drug utilization and thus their choice
represents their actual needs (rather than the factitious character Bill). Second, this group might
be more risk averse (or face greater health risks), and hence willing to pay more for greater
coverage. Interestingly, being risk averse might prove to be financially beneficial in the
Medicare part D environment. Looking at real drug utilization among Medicare beneficiaries,
Domino and colleagues (2008) found that many would incur financial loss, due to changes in
drug use and drug coverage, if they stick to the cheapest drug plan. That is, as it is difficult to
foresee what medications one might require in the future, picking a less generous drug plan
(which tends to be cheaper) could carry a financial cost. Domino et al.’s (2008) research captures
nicely the possible trade-off that beneficiaries must make between price and coverage. Indeed,
about a quarter of the sample who indicated coverage in the gap as the most important factor in
their decisions failed to choose the cheapest drug plan on the menu. At the same time, as with
our general results, this subset also made better decisions when faced with fewer choices and
symbolic prices.
Our finding, coupled with others (Domino et al.’s, 2008; McWilliams et al., 2011) further
illustrates the complex nature of choosing a Medicare part D drug plan, and the need to provide
beneficiaries with a more user friendly decision environment. In the midst of a broadening
concern over the national debt, entitlement reform has again come into the spotlight with all
sides aiming to control Medicare costs. This research suggests minor changes to the Medicare
Part D website, in particular the presentation of price, may lead to cost savings for beneficiaries
as well as the government. While further research is needed to determine the potential scope of
the savings, policies aimed at price frames appear to be low-hanging fruit with little political risk
and should be considered further.
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Figure 1.
A trial of Mouselab screenshot: choosing a Medicare prescription drug plan for Bill from nine
different plans. Information hidden underneath a box would only be presented if participants
moved the mouse over that box.
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Table 1. Sample Characteristics (N=126, 955 trials)
Variable
Chose lowest cost plan
Annual amount lost if did not choose lowest cost plan
(range $50 - $338)
Numeric prices
Real drug plan names
Nine drug plans
Age 65 or older
Female
Other race/ethnicity
College
Married
Took notes
Mental component score
(range 0-100)
Physical component score
(range 0-100)
Numeracy
(range 0-11)

Mean
46.0%
$168.43

Std. Dev.
$84.07

49.7%
49.4%
50.2%
42.0%
63.2%
39.4%
36.9%
31.4%
39.4%
48.86

10.17

49.33

10.49

8.32

2.27
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Table 2. Risk Difference in Choosing the Lowest Cost Drug Plan, Monetary Loss Conditional on
Choosing a Higher Cost Plan and Price Frames, Brand Effects, and Choice Set Size1
Percentage point difference in
Monetary loss ($) conditional on
the probability of choosing the
choosing a higher cost plan
lowest cost drug plan
(N=117, 516 trials)
(N=126, 955 trials)
Risk differences and monetary loss for an experimental condition holding other experimental
conditions and covariates at original values
Predicted average
43.8%
$166.38
Numeric prices
+55.29
-8.0
(43.16, 67.06)
(-14.7, -0.9)
Real drug plan names
-6.4
-17.80
(-12.7, 2.4)
(-29.79, -5.99)
Nine drug plans
+40.31
-30.9
(24.79, 52.39)
(-35.6, -20.9)
Risk differences and monetary loss for combinations of experimental conditions holding
covariates at original values
Numeric Real
Nine
prices
names plans
No
No
No
80.3%
$89.66
No
Yes
No
-21.8
+158.91
(-34.3, -6.9)
(122.02, 189.42)
No
No
Yes
-32.9
-30.46
(-45.6, -15.3)
(-56.82, -8.37)
Yes
No
No
-56.9
+81.12
(-65.8, -39.5)
(47.47, 106.57)
No
Yes
Yes
-30.3
+76.38
(-42.0, -15.6)
(46.86, 99.31)
Yes
Yes
No
-54.2
+96.64
(-63.4, -32.5)
(68.83, 119.04)
Yes
No
Yes
-40.1
+98.62
(-50.7, -21.5)
(70.14, 124.89)
Yes
Yes
Yes
-56.0
+96.70
(-63.4, -34.5)
(66.89, 119.15)
1
Multi-level model regressions controlled for whether the participant was 65 years or older,
female, non-Caucasian race/ethnicity, completed some college, was married, mental and physical
component scores from the SF-12v2, note-taking, and numeracy. Bold denotes risk difference is
significantly different from zero at p<0.05.

25

Table 3. Risk Differences in Choosing the Lowest Cost Drug Plan With Coverage in the Gap,
Monetary Loss Conditional on Choosing a Higher Cost Plan Among Individuals Who Ranked
Coverage in the Gap as Most Important1
Percentage point difference
Monetary loss ($) conditional on
in the probability of
choosing a higher cost plan
choosing the lowest cost
(N=43, 146 trials)
drug plan with coverage in
the gap
(N=43, 146 trials)
Risk differences and monetary loss for an experimental condition holding other
experimental conditions and covariates at original values
Predicted average
76.0%
$186.71
Numeric prices
-14.5
+41.33
(-27.6, -1.4)
(23.34, 59.31)
Real drug plan
+8.9
-11.26
names
(-4.4, 22.1)
(-29.20, 6.67)
Nine drug plans
-18.8
+62.18
(-31.7, -5.9)
(43.95, 80.41)
1
Multi-level model regressions controlled for whether the participant was 65 years or older,
female, non-Caucasian race/ethnicity, completed some college, was married, mental and physical
component scores from the SF-12v2, note-taking, and numeracy. Bold denotes risk difference is
significantly different from zero at p<0.05
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